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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

l

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Respondent, :
v,

:

ROBERT A. DYER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority #2

Case No. 89-0729 CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a final judgment and conviction
rendered

against

appellant

for possession of psilocybin with

intent to distribute and possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute, both second degree felonies, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated §58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953, as amended); possession
of marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)

(1953, as

amended); and unlawful possession of marijuana without tax stamps
affixed,
Annotated,

a third

degree

§59-19-106

felony,

(1953,

in violation

as amended).

of Utah

This

Code

court has

jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §782a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether

the

underlying

warrant

appellant's apartment was so lacking

for

the

search

of

in probable cause as to

render a magistrate's belief in its existence unreasonable under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES
The

Constitutional

provisions

relevant

to

determination of this case are:
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
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a

Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant, Robert A, Dyer, was charged in a nine
count Information with one court of Arranging for Distribution
of a Controlled Substance, a second degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1953, as amended); two
counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to
Distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated

§58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)

(1953, as amended); one count of

Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §58-378(1)(a)(iv)

(1953,

as

amended);

three

counts

of

Unlawful

Possession of a Controlled Substance Without Tax Stamps Affixed,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §5919-106

(1953, as amended); one count of Aggravated Assault, a

third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-5103 (1953, as amended); and one count of Failure

to Stop at the

Command of a Police Officer, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Annotated §41-6-13.5 (1953, as amended).
- 3 -

Appellant pled guilty to, and was sentenced on, the two
second degree felony counts of possession with intent to distribute, and one third degree felony count of unlawful possession
of marijuana without tax stamps affixed.

The remaining counts,

along with a separate single-count Information, were dismissed,
(R. 65).
On

October

24,

1989,

the

trial

court

sentenced

appellant to a concurrent, indeterminate prison term of 1 to 15
years for the second degree felonies and 0-5 years for the third
degree felonies.

(R. 82). The court, however, issued a Certifi-

cate of Probable Cause and allowed appellant to post bond pending
this appeal.

(R. 71-73).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 1, 1989, a search warrant was executed at
appellant's residence in Layton, Utah.
based on information

(R. 14). The warrant was

presented in an Affidavit (attached in the

Addendum hereto) signed by Detective Lon Brian of the Davis Metro
Narcotics Strike Force (the "affiant").
The Affidavit

states that

(R. 14).

the officer

had received

information from another officer that a third individual ("Informant I") told the officer two weeks earlier that appellant had
sold

Informant

I some cocaine.

- 4 -

(R. 17).

The affiant also

claimed to have been told in the past by other informants that
appellant trafficked in controlled substances.
these informants, Informant
January

23, 1989, that

apartment.

(R. 17). One of

II f allegedly told the affiant on

he observed

marijuana

in appellant's

(R. 17).

The affiant, as early as 1987, had also been informed
that appellant sold drugs.

(R. 18).

On February 1, 1989, based on Informant Ill's tip that
appellant was going to sell drugs to him later that day, the
Davis Metro Strike Force officers approached and pursued appellant's truck in a high speed chase.

(R. 18).

The officers,

however, found no controlled substance in the truck or on appellant when the vehicle was finally stopped.

(R. 18).

III,

high

who

was

with

appellant

during

the

Informant

speed

chase,

allegedly "stated that Mr. Dyer [appellant] had [some] cocaine
but threw it out of the window."

(R. 18).

The affiant then

related that Informant II had given reliable information on past
occasions.
As

(R. 18).
a result

of

the search, quantities

of cocaine,

marijuana and psilocybin mushrooms were discovered and seized.
Appellant thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to four
counts of the nine count Information, reserving his right to
appeal the underlying search warrant as violative of the United

- 5 -

States and Utah Constitutions.

(R. 65, 71-73).

On August 28,

1989, the trial court denied appellant's Motion to Suppress, see
the Addendum,

on the ground

that

the warrant

underlying

searches and seizures was supported by probable cause.

the

(R. 62).

The court then sentenced appellant to a concurrent, indeterminate
prison term of 1 to 15 years for the two second degree felonies
and 0 to 5 years for the third degree felonies.

(R. 82).

The

court, however, issued a Certificate of Probable Cause, allowing
appellant to post bond pending this

appeal.

(R. 71-73).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The affidavit in support of the search warrant executed
at appellant's apartment was so lacking in probable cause as to
render the magistrate's belief
The only

in its existence unreasonable.

information tending to support the presence of con-

trolled substances in the apartment were the naked assertions of
Informant

I, whose credibility the affiant never established.

The magistrate's belief that such information established probable cause was, therefore, clearly unreasonable and violative of
the United States and Utah Constitutions.

- 6 -

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE POLICE OFFICER-AFFIANT LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO
BELIEVE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES WERE IN APPELLANT'S
APARTMENT WHERE THE UNDERLYING DRUG DEAL HAD PROVIDED
THAT APPELLANT WOULD DELIVER DRUGS IN HIS VEHICLE.
The
Constitution,
Amendment,

Fourth

Amendment

to

the

United

States

applicable to the States through the Fourteenth

provides

in relevant part

that

"no warrants shall

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or things to be seized."

In Illinois v» Gates, 462 U.S.

213 (1983), the Supreme Court discussed the nature of a decision
a magistrate must make in deciding whether to issue a warrant.
Implicit in that discussion is a description of what constitutes
probable cause to issue a search warrant.

The Court stated:

[The magistrate's decision is] simply to make a common
sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit, including the "veracity" and
"basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution is similar in
all respects to the Fourth Amendment. The Utah Supreme Court has
indicated a willingness to give broader protection, however,
under Article I, Section 14.
State v. Nielson, 727 P.2d 188
(Utah 1986).

- 7 -

Id. at 238.
Similarly, in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926
(1984), the Court held that where a warrant has been issued by a
committing magistrate, the exclusionary rule will not be applied
unless the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause
as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.
In the present case, there was no information tending
to show that any of the evidence seized would be located in
appellant's residence.

Thus, Officer Brian's Affidavit lacked

any indicia of probable cause as required by Gates and Leon.
First, Informant I, whose reliability the affiant never established, had allegedly seen, two weeks earlier, approximately nine
ounces of cocaine in the apartment.

(R. 18).

The affiant, and

the officer who related this information to him, both failed to
verify the truthfulness of Informant I's assertions.
Similarly, a week before the execution of the warrant,
Informant II allegedly observed small quantities of marijuana in
appellant's residence.

(R. 18).

Although the affiant vouched

for her reliability, Informant II did not specify the quantity of
the marijuana she had observed, nor did she intimate whether it
was for personal use or distribution.

In State v. Adkinsf 346

S.E.2d 762 (W. Va. 1986), the court ruled that an affidavit which
asserted that a confidential

informant had observed marijuana

- 8 -

inside the premises was insufficient to establish probable cause.
The court further held Leon inapplicable in such a situation,
since "good faith" reliance would not apply.
The instant case is analogous to Adkins.

Here, the

only information tending towards possible criminal activity on
appellant's part, other than Informant II's naked assertions, was
Informant I's observation of him two weeks earlier in possession
of a certain quantity of cocaine.
Equally unreliable and lacking in probable cause was
the affiant's statement that appellant agreed to sell Informant
III an ounce of cocaine on the day the warrant was executed.
According to the affiant, the sale of an ounce of cocaine was to
be consummated in appellant's vehicle, not in his apartment.
18).

(R.

Such information should not, therefore, have furnished a

magistrate probable cause for issuing a search warrant to search
the residence, since the use of the vehicle increases the probability that the drugs were being picked up at a separate location.

See Gates, supra; Adkins, supra.

Ill's statement

that

appellant

In addition, Informant

threw the cocaine out of the

vehicle's window during the high speed chase adds nothing to the
threshold inquiry.

Gates, supra: Leon, supra.

Even if appellant

had thrown some cocaine out of the truck, that did not compel, in
the

instant

case,

a

finding

of

- 9 -

probable

cause

to

search

appellant's
officers

apartment.

probable

cause

At

best,

such

to

conduct

an

act

furnishes

a warrantless

the

search of

appellant's truck and person.
The

only

information

relating

to

the

presence

of

controlled substances in appellant's apartment was Informant I's
two-week-old

observation

concerning

possession

and

sale

of

cocaine, an observation which the officers failed to promptly
pursue.

Thus, it was unreasonable to believe that the informa-

tion related by the informants, coupled with the affiantfs unsubstantiated

allegations,

established

probable

cause.

Conse-

quently, the Leon exception to the exclusionary rule should not
apply in the instant case.

Thus, appellant urges this court to

reverse the trial court by holding unconstitutional the underlying warrant executed for the search of his apartment*

POINT II
THE MAGISTRATE ABANDONED HIS DETACHED FUNCTION AND
ACTED AS A RUBBER STAMP FOR CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE
POLICE OFFICER.
Appellant submits that, under the circumstances in the
instant

case, the

issuing magistrate, by not

requiring

facts

substantiating the officer's claims, abandoned his neutral and
detached role.
the police

In other words, the magistrate became an ally of

and merely

"rubber stamped"

- 10 -

the officer-affiant's

statement*

See, e.g., Leon at 3244; Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New

York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979).
the good

faith

exception,

When the Leon Court established

it nevertheless

retained

the long

standing rule that:
. . . it remains for the reviewing court to
decide whether the magistrate performed his
neutral and detached function on the facts
before him, and did not merely serve as a
rubber stamp for conclusions drawn by the
police. U.S. v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341, 345
(2d Cir. 1983).
Leon at 914.
In the instant case, the magistrate did nothing more,
given the facts before him, than serve as an unquestioning observer and rubber stamp for the conclusory statements of the
affiant.

There

were

no

independent

facts

confirming

the

affiant's conclusion that appellant was a drug dealer who was
selling drugs from his residence.

All that was presented to the

magistrate were facts tending, at best, to show that appellant
would sell drugs to someone from his truck.
crete, reliable

information demonstrating

There was no con-

that

appellant sold

drugs or was about to sell drugs in his apartment.
In State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1988), police
officers had arranged a controlled drug buy at the defendant's
residence seven days prior to the execution of a search warrant
for the residence.

The Utah Supreme Court, in response to the

- 11 -

defendant's probable cause challenge, noted that the officer had
observed the controlled buy and thus had knowledge that it had,
in fact, occurred at the defendant's residence.

After quoting

the Gates rule, the court concluded:
[A] 11 of these events were within the personal knowledge of the officer. Contrary to
defendant's argument, the only part of [the
officer's] affidavit in which the knowledge,
veracity and reliability of a confidential
informant are at issue involves the second
informant's naked assertion that heroin was
being sold out of the residence. The second
informant's hearsay evidence is merely corroborative of the more substantive information contained in the affidavit. In issuing
the warrant, the magistrate had available
first hand observations of the affiant, an
experienced narcotics officer.
Id. at 1115.
Contrary to the facts in Ayala, the officer-affiant in
the instant case had no first-hand knowledge regarding any sale
that took place or was to take place in appellant's apartment.
Further, the supplementary but naked assertions of the informants
added nothing to the magisterial inquiry.
presented

to the magistrate

in the

Thus, the affidavit

instant case was a "bare

bones" affidavit, unsupported by probable cause.
Leon, suppression of

the fruits of the

Under Gates and

illegal searches and

seizures is appropriate since there was no showing of probable
cause by the affiant.

The magistrate, in issuing the warrant in

- 12 -

the instant casef therefore abandoned his neutral role by rubber
stamping the conclusory statement of the officer-affiant.

CONCLUSION
The
pursuant

seizure

of

the

evidence

to the search warrant

in

the

was violative

instant
of

case

appellant's

rights described in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United

States Constitution

and Article

Constitution of the State of Utah,

I, Section

14 of the

This court should, therefore,

reverse the lower court and vacate appellant's convictions and
sentences on all counts and order that the matter be set for
trial.
RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED AND DATED this

February, 1990.
RONALD J. YENGICH
Attorney for Appellant
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day of

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that two true and correct copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid, to
the Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 84114, this

day of February, 1990.
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A D D E N D U M

MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-3227
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LAYTON DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT FOR
In Re: Search of the
residence located at
181 Cushing Way
Layton, Utah
occupied by Robert Dyer

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss:

SEARCH WARRANT

Before the honorable K. Roger Bean, Circuit Court Judge,
the undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that
he has probable cause to believe that on the premises which are
described as:
nee located at
Way
tah
Occupied by Robert Dyer

there is now certain property described as:
Controlled Substances
Razor blades, mirrors, and plastic or metal
tubes used to ingest controlled substances.
Other types of drug paraphernalia used to ingest
or facilitate the sale of controlled
substances•
Records, account books, or other forms of recorded
narcotics trafficking.
Pictures, receipts, personal property or other
items evidencing ownership, occupation or
control of the above premises or rooms therein.

The facts to establish the issuance of this warrant are as
follows:
1. That the affiant is an investigator with the Davis Metro
Narcotics Strike Force and is familiar with the facts presented
herein.
2. Affiant received information from Richard Bliss, an
officer with Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force that a
confidential informant told him approximately two weeks ago that
Robert Dyer had in his residence at 181 Cushing Way, Layton,
Utah, approximately nine ounces of cocaine, one of which the
\£-

informant purchasedj
/ ^ \

Affiant has received information in the past from four

otntec^nformants that Mr. Dyer was trafficking in controlled
substances.
4.

Affiant on January 23, 1989, had one of the four

J(\ informants in Mr. Dyer's residence where narcotic paraphernalia
and small quantities of marijuana were observed.

The informant

further indicated that Mr. Dyer told him that he would be
^

obtaining additional controlled substances, specifically

marijuana, in the next few days.
5.

X0

Affiant further had information from a third informant

in November of 1987 that the informant had been purchasing pound
quantities of marijuana and hallucinogenics from Mr. Dyer.
6.

On February 1# 1989, affiant was present during recorded

communication between an informant and Mr. Robert Dyer wherein
/\Mr. Dyer agreed to provide a one ounce quantity of cocaine to the
informant.

The informant was given instructions to contact Mr.

Dyer from a payphone on SR 193 and Fairfield in Layton.

Affiant

was informed by Officer Bliss that the initial contact with Mr.
f/by&r

had been by telephone to MrT DyerA^-^e^dtence.
7.

The informant then indicated that he was to meet Dyer at

another location and officers of the Davis Metro Narotics Strike
Force observed the informant inside a white truck being driven by
Mr. Dyer.
8.

After the observations, affiant engaged in a high speed

chase and observed baggies being thrown out of the truck.

The

truck was finally stopped and affiant spoke with the informant
who stated that Mr. Dyer had the cocaine but threw it out of the
window.
>

* V^'^T
r
^ r W ,*^
X*

I

9

>

Affiant believes that the informant that was in the

residence on January 23 is reliable as he has been involved in
^ prior narcotics transactions that have resulted in the arrest and
conviction of over 20 persons.
10. Based on affiantfs experience and training as a
narcotics officer, a drug dealer will often keep records and

accounts of their transactions, and proceeds of their dealings
will appear in sales receipts and bank records.

These same

receipts and bank records show ownership and occupancy of
the residence and its contents.
8. Based on affiant's experience and training as a
narcotics officer during the last three years it is often the
case that a drug dealer or user
will keep miscellaneous paraphernalia to facilitate their use of
narcotics, and the dispensing of them.
records of drug transactions

The dealer will also keep

and evidence of ownership or

residency of the premises within the residence itself.
9.

Affiant believes from the foregoing that there is

probable cause to believe that there are controlled substances
and other items as identified herein within the above mentioned
residence.

Affiant further knows that the residence will need to

be searched during the nighttime as Mr. Dyer has been arrested
and may contact someone to eliminate any controlled substances
that may be within the residence.

Affiant is further aware that

controlled substances may be easily destroyed and concealed and
that dealers in controlled substances often maintain weapons at
their residence for use in protecting themselves and their
controlled substances and therefore requests authorization for
entry of the residence without announcing the officer's purpose
or identity.

WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a search warrant be issued
for the search of the above described

premises and the seizure

of any of the said items and that the same be authorized for
issuance in the nighttime without notice of purpose or authority,

5/.ic^_.i„.Ml.

K

Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to me this 1st day of February,
1989.

S/

(^j^£^l__fe_^5_bl

Circuit Court Judge

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUD^efAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS ,>"£TATE OF UTAH

Si

THE tSTATE OF UTAH,
/

/

Plaintiff
s^~y()
VS.

/

ROBERT/A.

/ \

I

fcitt,

/ /

Npekand^nt.

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION

/

•

T0

SUPPRESS

yS

:

Case No.

6378 & 6380

•

The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for
hearing before the above-entitled court and the court having
reviewed that portion of the transcript referred to by counsel
and having reviewed the affidavit and search warrant and
memorandum submitted by counsel and being fully advised in the
premises hereby rules as follows.
In the first instance, the court recognizes that the
traditional test of Aguilar and Spinelli, which set out a two
prong test which had to be met to establish the reliability of an
informant as a basis for a search warrant, has now been abandoned
by both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the State
of Utah.

Spinelli vs. The United States 393 US 410, 21 L Ed 2d

637 (1969), Aguilar vs. Texas 378 US 108, 12 L ed 2d 723 (1964);
Illinois vs. Gates 462 US 213 (1983); The State of Utah vs.
Anderton

Utah

, 668 Pacific 2nd 1258 (1983).

The hypertechnical requirements of the Spinelli and
Aguilar have now given way to a common sense interpretation based
on a totality of the circumstances.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Gates Supra it states
sitsuccinctly when it held:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common-sensed decision whether, given all of the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
including the "voracity and basis of knowledge" of the
person supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that the contraband or evidence of crime in a
particular place.
Our own Supreme Court in discussing the common-sense
approach stated in the Anderton case quoting from Spinelli:
That probability and not prima facia showing
a criminal activity is the standard of probable
cause
in judging probable cause issuing
magistrates are not to be confused by niggardly
limitations or by restriction of the use of their
common sense, and their determination of probable
cause should be paid great deference by the
reviewing courts.
In reviewing the affidavit in support of the warrant
herein questioned, the warrant contained the following
information.
The affiant had received information from four
different informants that defendant was trafficking in controlled
substance.
Affiant was informed by a particular informant that he
had purchased pound quantities of marijuana and hallucinogens
from defendant in 1987.

Detective Bliss, an associate of the affiant's on the
task force, reported that one of his informants had told him that
he had been in the Dyer home at 181 Cushing Way in Layton
approximately two weeks prior to the date of the affidavit and
that defendant had in his possession nine ounces of cocaine at
the residence and that the informant had purchased one of the
ounces.
That one of the four informants had told the affiant
that he was in defendant's residence on January 23, 1989 and had
observed marijuana and drug paraphernalia.

That the defendant

had represented that he expected to receive additional controlled
substance specifically marijuana within the next few days.
That said confidential informant had previously been
involved in the arrest and conviction of over 20 persons involved
in drug transactions.
That the affiant was present on February 1, 1989, the
date of the search warrant, and recorded a conversation between
the informant and the defendant wherein defendant agreed to
provide one ounce of cocaine to the informant.
The defendant instructed the informant to go to a
certain pay phone to call the defendant.
The informant advised the affiant that he was required
to meet the defendant at another location.
The affiant observed informant in a truck driven by the
defendant.

A high-speed chase ensued with the affiant pursuing.
Affiant observed baggies being thrown out of the truck.
truck was eventually stopped.

The

Informant informed the affiant

that defendant had the cocaine but threw it out the window during
the chase.
Affiant was an experienced officer working on the drug
task force, was experienced with the drug scene and the manner of
doing business therein.
Affiant as an experienced narcotics officer was aware
that drug dealers often keep,accounts of transactions, proceeds
from deals, and bank records at their place of residence.
Affiant as an experienced narcotics officer was also
aware that drug dealers often keep drug paraphernalia at their
residence to facilitate the use and dispensing of controlled
substances.
Affiant was informed by a fellow officer, Detective
Bliss, that the initial contact with the defendant had been by
telephone at his residence.
With the foregoing facts, this court concludes that
from all of the information set forth in the affidavit taken from
a common sense point of view there was a fair probability that
defendant resided in the residence in question and that
controlled substance, paraphernalia, and records of drug
trafficking would be found therein.

Even assuming for the purposes of argument that the
affidavit in question was inadequate to support the warrant, the
court concludes that evidence obtained in the case would be
admitted under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
as set forth in

U.S. vs. Leon 468 US 897, 82 L ed 2nd 677

(1984).
The Leon Court recognized a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule and in so doing ruled that inherently
trustworthy, tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a search
warrant issued by a detached 'and neutral magistrate may be
admitted even though said warrant is ultimately found to be
defective.
In so doing the Leon Court recognized that the
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safe
guard Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect.

It

was designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish
errors of judges and magistrates.
The court went on the say that suppression of evidence
obtained pursuant to a defective warrant should only be ordered
on a case by case basis and only in the unusual case in which the
exclusion would further the purpose of the exclusionary rule.
As that court stated, there is no deterrent effect
where the offending officers acted in an objectively reasonable
belief that their conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

In discussing the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule, the court indicated that the rule assumes that the police
have engaged in willful or at least negligent conduct which has
deprived the defendant of some right; where the official action
was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrent
rational loses much of its force.
In the matter here before the Court, the warrant was
properly executed, the officer searched only those places and for
those objects that it was reasonable to believe were covered by
the warrant.
The record and the evidence is devoid of any indication
that the affiant misled by information that affiant knew was
false or would have known was false except for his reckless
disregard of truth; or that the magistrate wholly abandoned his
judicial role, or that the warrant was based on an affidavit so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render the official
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.
This court believes that the officers in this case
acted with objective, good faith in obtaining the warrant and
acted reasonably within the scope thereof and that, therefore,
even assuming that the affidavit was defective to exclude the
evidence so obtained would not further the ends of the
exclusionary rule in any manner, but would only tend to make the
officers less willing to do their job in the future.

Based upon the foregoing, defendant's motion to
suppress is hereby denied.
DATED this

2 & ^ day of August,

A.D., 1989.
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